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Sale of Goods and Intellectual Property: Problems with 
Ownership 
 
Dr Sean Thomas
  
Senior Lecturer in Commercial Law 
School of Law 
University of Leicester 
 
Sale of goods and intellectual property are necessarily connected.  Intellectual 
property rights (IPRs), such as copyright, patents, trade marks and design rights, 
can be discussed and analysed as a coherent whole. However, the impact of the 
connection between sales of goods and IPRs has been somewhat ignored from 
both sides (sales, and intellectual property). In the digital era, questions 
concerning the interrelationship of sale of goods law and intellectual property 
law have become particularly problematic. There are difficulties in determining 
the rights of purchasers of goods, due to the structure of the law on sale and 
doctrinal complexity in intellectual property law. In this article, the effect of 
potential growth in embedded and nano-technologies, as well as the impact of 
IPR pirates (those who take without authority), trolls (those who acquire IPRs 
purely for their financial re-disposition value), and tyrants (those who misuse 
the considerable strength of IPRs to prevent usage) will be analysed. It will be 
suggested that a reliance on the usual, pragmatic methods of solving the 
identified problems will be insufficient to deal with the growth of integrated 
goods. 
 
Introduction 
 
We are living in a digital age. Unsurprisingly, this has an impact on the role of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) in society.
1
 Yet, access to digital information is conditional on some 
sort of physical conduit. Goods enable us to access digital information. Moreover, 
technological development is resulting in considerable advances in integrated goods, i.e. 
goods which have a high level of integration between the physical functionality of the goods 
and the software enabling the functionality. A typical example is goods with embedded 
software. Integrated goods may also reach another level of integration, achievable at a nano-
technological level: integration with organic matter. These examples of integrated goods will 
be considered later in this article, along with a third development: three dimensional (3-D) 
printing. With regard to 3-D printing, the integration between goods and digital information 
occurs during the manufacturing process, rather than resulting in the finished product. These 
three examples illustrate modern developments in the interconnection between people (the 
users), ideas (the information integrated in the goods), and goods. They necessitate the 
development of understanding of the jurisprudential interaction between goods, and 
intellectual property (IP).
2
 The aim of this article is to provide an outline of this interaction.
3
 
 
The thread that runs through this analysis is the role of ownership in transactions involving 
integrated goods. Specifically, this article will consider the issues that arise concerning the 
ownership of goods and IP in instances where both have become intertwined in such a way as 
  
to make it difficult to conceptualise the finished product without the IP element. The types of 
integrated goods mentioned above are just such products. As this article considers ownership, 
it is necessary then to discuss the impact of the various nefarious characters involved in IP 
transactions and dispositions: pirates (those who take, and sometimes dispose of, IP without 
authorisation); trolls (those who obtain IP rights in an attempt to obtain rent from users of IP); 
and tyrants (those who unduly restrict IPRs under their control). It will be argued that the 
current doctrinal structure fails to provide a coherent mechanism for dealing with current and 
potential ownership disputes between owners of integrated goods and IPR holders. 
Furthermore, it will be argued that the current structure fails to prevent potential IP tyranny. 
 
The Current Position 
 
The development of information societies has had a profound impact on our current 
understanding of IPRs, in the context of their doctrinal structure, as well as in terms of the 
broader ethical and philosophical disputes which help to identify, crystallise, modify and 
remove the boundaries of debating intellectual property.
4
 Some considerable problems can be 
identified with the current position in IP law:
5
 
 
(1) The phenomenon of the redefinition of intellectual property is that it entails a change 
in the relationship between the public and private spheres … [i.e.] which goods can be 
legitimately treated as commodities”. 
 
(2) The exclusive or monopolistic nature of IPRs where they harm “a legitimate public 
interest in broad access” to the things covered by such IPRs.6 
 
(3) The homogeneity of IPRs protection “independent of the area of application”.  
 
Ultimately, “[w]e simply do not know how a society which privatises and commercialises all 
spheres of its cultural productivity develops”.7 The questions and problems are amplified 
when it is recognised that IPRs are “essentially negative: they are rights to stop others doing 
certain things”, i.e. using or copying or expressing ideas or inventions or expressions that are 
controlled by IPR holders.
8
 
 
These questions also raise issues concerning goods, particularly where goods have attached 
IP, or there are embedded aspects of goods which are covered by IP. In an information 
society, with the development of an internet of things,
9
 the monopolistic power of IPRs 
combined with the homogenous protection provided by IP law can lead to complexities, 
especially when the incoherence and variability of IP protection is taken into account. These 
factors make it difficult to determine with certainty the validity of sales of goods, particularly 
(though not necessarily) in cross-border transactions. Because most IPRs are domestic in 
reach,
10
 “products may legitimately be produced in a country where no relevant rights exist, 
but as soon as they are exported to a jurisdiction where those rights do exist there will, in 
principle, be an infringement”.11 
 
A common feature of the digital age is the immense difficulty of encapsulating digital 
information within jurisdictional boundaries, which means that “infringement issues can 
potentially be brought before different national courts on a grand scale”.12 As a consequence, 
what follows casts a deliberately broad jurisdictional net. What is apparent is that the limited 
protection provided by IP law for dealings with goods covered by IP – implied licences and 
  
exhaustion doctrines – cannot be justified as a valid structure for the development of laws 
sufficient for the future technological development of integrated goods. 
 
Rights of Purchaser 
 
The recent “patent wars” between various manufacturers has revealed the immense 
complexity surrounding ownership of various IPRs which are utilised in modern 
technology.
13
 One of the potentially problematic consequences of the patent wars are the 
instances of injunctions being granted in various jurisdictions prohibiting the sale of certain 
products which have components or software which has infringed on IPRs.
14
 Such 
developments are not limited to the smartphone patent wars. 
 
Thus, in BASF SE v Sipcam (UK) Ltd,
15
 BASF applied and obtained an interim injunction 
preventing Sipcam from selling a herbicide in the UK which BASF argued infringed its IPRs. 
This occurred even though the two companies had enjoyed cordial relations, which involved 
the claimant selling a core element of the herbicide to the defendant. The importance of the 
impact of such injunctions or similar legal actions which could restrict commercial activity is 
clearly evidenced by the presidential vetoing of the decision of the US International Trade 
Commission prohibiting sales of certain Apple products that infringed a Samsung patent,
16
 on 
the basis of “the various policy considerations … as they relate to the effect on competitive 
conditions in the U.S. economy and the effect on U.S. consumers”.17 
 
These developments beg two simple questions: what can a purchaser do if he has obtained 
goods which infringe IPRs,
18
 and what can a seller do if his goods are deemed to infringe 
IPRs? The answers to these questions are unclear. It has been suggested that, at least for 
English sales law, that there is very little indeed that such buyers or sellers can do in order to 
protect their interests in the goods.
19
  What is needed is a radical reform of English sales law 
in order to take into account these modern developments, and provide purchasers with a 
measure of security for their acquisitions which in turn will protect and enhance the free flow 
of goods.
20
 
 
The problems associated with determining the ownership of goods which have embedded 
software demonstrate the presence of considerable doctrinal complexity, at least under the 
English legal system. This complexity is partially the consequence of the absence of a 
coherent policy of effective combining of sales law and IP law. This lack of combined 
thinking can be illustrated by a variety of factors. What follows is a brief analysis of how 
mechanisms developed in the IP law context to deal with the issue of IPR holders extending 
their control of IPRs down a chain of transactions raise more questions than they resolve. 
 
Doctrinal Complexity 
 
Exhaustion and First Sale 
 
The doctrine of exhaustion deals with the question of when in the process of production and 
distribution of goods is it no longer necessary to obtain a licence from an IPR holder where 
the goods have IP attached.  Generally speaking, the doctrine holds that IPRs are exhausted 
following the first sale by the IPR holder or with his consent. Yet. this exhaustion doctrine is 
often territorially limited: it is a “principle of domestic, rather than international, exhaustion. 
Accordingly, national rights that are subject to such limitation can still be used to prevent the 
  
importation of goods sold abroad by the national right-owner or goods which come from an 
associated enterprise”.21 
 
Furthermore, the British approach has depended on the subject matter, and the lack of a 
general concept of exhaustion enabled to the creation of a position in British patent law 
which was contrary to the usual position in legal systems: i.e. the patent holder was entitled to 
request licences beyond a first sale. 
 
Thus, it is to the US system that we must look for a clear outline of the doctrine of 
exhaustion. In Quanta Computer Inc v LG Electronics,
22
 a case before the US Supreme Court 
on exhaustion of a method patent, Thomas J (giving the judgment of the Court), held that the 
doctrine of exhaustion was applicable. In doing so, he stated that “[t]he longstanding doctrine 
of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorised sale of a patented item terminates all 
patent rights to that item”.23 
 
Furthermore, the Judge followed the decision of the Supreme Court in US v Univis Lens Co,
24
 
and noted that “the traditional bar on patent restrictions following the sale of an item applies 
when the item sufficiently embodies the patent – even if it does not completely practise the 
patent – such that its only and intended use is to be finished under the terms of the patent”.’25 
It should also be noted though that the weight of authority indicates that the US doctrine of 
exhaustion is territorially bound; the sales must be in the US to exhaust the patent right.
26
 
 
Eagles and Longdin have noted that “[e]xhaustion of rights makes sense only when the 
intellectual property right in question is embodied in a physical object, property in which at 
some stage passes out of the hands of the right holder”.27 They further argue that the shift 
away from tangibility caused by digitisation makes exhaustion less relevant than ever. Yet, it 
is still worth considering developments concerning transfers of IP in a purely intangible 
sense, i.e. those situations where the IPRs are not transferred by virtue of being embedded 
within goods. A particular problem concerns the resale of digital content,
28
 and the very 
recent New York decision Capitol Records LLC v ReDigi Inc,
29
 exemplifies this. 
 
ReDigi Inc operated an online market for users to sell and buy (legitimately acquired) digital 
music files at a cheaper rate than what was being charged by iTunes. The process of selling 
such files involved an uploading of the digital file to a cloud server, which had the 
simultaneous effect of deleting the file from the seller’s device. The seller would retain 
access (so as to be able to stream the file) until it was sold, at which point the seller’s access 
rights would end.
30
 ReDigi was sued by Capitol Records, which owned the copyright to the 
music. Under the US Copyright Act 17 USC, §109, a lawful purchaser of copyrighted 
material is able to resell that material, without having to obtain permission from the copyright 
holder: this is the first sale doctrine. The US District Court for the Southern District of New 
York determined that the first sale doctrine was inapplicable, because there had been an 
unauthorised copying of the music when it had been uploaded to ReDigi’s servers.31 This 
copying meant that the first sale doctrine was inapplicable, because: 
 
the first sale defence is limited to material items, like records, that the copyright 
owner put into the stream of commerce. Here, ReDigi is not distributing such material 
items; rather, it is distributing reproductions of the copyrighted code embedded in 
new material objects, namely, the ReDigi server in Arizona and its users' hard drives. 
The first sale defence does not cover this any more than it covered the sale of cassette 
recordings of vinyl records in a bygone era.
32
 
  
ReDigi’s arguments that this analysis was incompatible with the modern digital environment 
were dismissed on the grounds that the US Copyright Office “rejected extension of the first 
sale doctrine to the distribution of digital works, noting that the justifications for the first sale 
doctrine in the physical world could not be imported into the digital domain”.33 The District 
Court appeared to follow and approve of the US Copyright Office’s analysis,34 so it is worth 
repeating here: 
 
Physical copies of works degrade with time and use, making used copies less 
desirable than new ones. Digital information does not degrade, and can be 
reproduced perfectly on a recipient’s computer. The “used” copy is just as desirable 
as (in fact, is indistinguishable from) a new copy of the same work. Time, space, effort 
and cost no longer act as barriers to the movement of copies, since digital copies can 
be transmitted nearly instantaneously anywhere in the world with minimal effort and 
negligible cost. The need to transport physical copies of works, which acts as a 
natural brake on the effect of resales on the copyright owner’s market, no longer 
exists in the realm of digital transmissions. The ability of such “used” copies to 
compete for market share with new copies is thus far greater in the digital world.
35
 
 
Where the first sale doctrine would apply would be in sales of the specific tangible location 
of the digital file, such as an MP3 player of or a computer hard disk: “While this limitation 
clearly presents obstacles to resale that are different from, and perhaps even more onerous 
than, those involved in the resale of CDs and cassettes, the limitation is hardly absurd – the 
first sale doctrine was enacted in a world where the ease and speed of data transfer could not 
have been imagined”.36 
 
Clearly then, there are problems applying the exhaustion doctrine to digital sales, and these 
problems exist in other jurisdictions. The EU Information Society Directive
37
 provides that: 
 
Copyright protection under this Directive includes the exclusive right to control 
distribution of the work incorporated in a tangible article. The first sale in the 
Community of the original of a work or copies thereof by the rightholder or with his 
consent exhausts the right to control resale of that object in the Community. This right 
should not be exhausted in respect of the original or of copies thereof sold by the 
rightholder or with his consent outside the Community.
38
 
 
However, exhaustion “does not arise in the cases of … on-line services in particular. … 
Unlike CD-ROM or CD-I, where the intellectual property is incorporated in a material 
medium, namely an item of goods, every on-line service is in fact an act which should be 
subject to authorisation where the copyright or related right so provides”.39 
 
This raises particular problems for integrated goods, particularly for goods which are part of 
the internet of things.  Such integrated goods may be constantly sending and receiving data, 
which would of course be supplied in an entirely digital format. In such cases, it may be 
difficult demonstrate the level of disposal necessary to bring into bearing the EU exhaustion 
doctrine on the IPR over the software, because of Article 4(2) of the Directive: “The 
distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in respect of the original or 
copies of the work”, except where there is an exhausting first sale by the IPR holder or with 
his consent. The exhausting first sale must have occurred within the EU; extra-EU sales will 
require licensing.
40
 
 
  
The effect of this, and the interaction between IP law and sales law, is illustrated by 
Independiente Ltd v Music Trading On-line (HK) Ltd.
41
 There, the defendant operated an 
online retail business whereby customers could order CDs or DVDs, which were sold out of 
Hong Kong. The claimant argued that the defendant was in contempt of an earlier 
undertaking not to supply non-EEA CDs or DVDs to UK purchasers. 
 
Evans-Lombe J held that there was a breach of, inter alia, s.18 of the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988. However, the defendant argued that the property in the goods passed to the 
customer prior to export from Hong Kong, and thus the goods were put into circulation in the 
UK by the customer “who would not have been guilty of infringement because he did so for 
the purpose of his private use”.42 This argument was dismissed;43 the effect of s.32(4) of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 meant that the delivery of the goods to the carrier was not a delivery 
to the consumer buyer.
44
 As such, it was the defendant (and not the consumer) who put the 
goods into circulation in the UK, and thus was liable for copyright infringement. 
 
Thus, “rightholders remain in principle entitled to control the digital uses of their works”.45 
 
The effect of this reasoning can be seen in with the decision of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, in UsedSoft v Oracle.
46
 There, it was held that a software licence was 
actually a contract of sale, and that the downloading of software meant that the “purchaser” 
could resell his “licence” as the downloading exhausted Oracle’s distribution rights over the 
copy that the “purchaser” acquired. This particular decision has been criticised: Moon for 
example compares the CJEU’s approach unfavourably with that taken by the New York 
court.
47
 The CJEU took the approach that the provision under Article 4(2) of the Software 
Directive 2009/24,
48
 of the possibility of exhaustion of a distribution right in a copy of a 
program upon first sale of that object,
49
 meant that the: 
 
… use of the word “object” seems to indicate art.4(2) only applies to works in the 
form of physical things or on physical media. A digital file delivered online is neither. 
That alone would mean the rightholder’s distribution right for intangible digital files 
would not be exhausted under art.4(2). Also the use of the words “that object”, 
assuming for a moment that intangible “objects” can exist, must mean that it is in 
respect of the exact object that the rightholder has sold that exhaustion occurs – not 
the subsequent copy of that object which the technology actually creates when 
downloading a digital file.
50
 
 
For Moon, ‘“the question nobody in either the United States or Europe seems to be asking is 
whether it is indisputably correct to assert that exhaustion of the distribution right should 
apply irrespective of whether works are delivered online or on physical media? … [T]here is 
still the critical legal issue of whether the contract between the copyright owner and the first 
acquirer of a digital copy is a sale or a licence.”51 For the purposes of this article, what these 
developments in technology (and lack thereof in doctrine) illustrate is the failure of the 
conceptual areas of IP law and sales law to correspond with each other. There is considerable 
tension between protecting IPRs and protecting the rights of sellers and buyers to dispose of 
and acquire goods and IPRs (whether embedded or otherwise), which will remain at the heart 
of commercial jurisprudence (in practice and in theory), and will continue to be unresolved 
unless and until it is acknowledged that the division between IP and sales needs to be tackled 
head-on. 
 
  
In British Leyland Motor Copr Corp v Armstrong Patents Co Ltd,
52
 the House of Lords had 
to contend with a claim for copyright infringement. The alleged infringer produced spare 
parts, but had refused to take a licence from the claimants (who designed the cars and 
produced and/or licensed sub-production of spare parts). The House held that, whilst there 
was ordinarily and infringement of the claimant’s copyright (in the designs for the spare 
parts), the defendant was not liable. Lord Bridge noted that it would be “unnecessary and 
may be misleading to introduce [into copyright] the concept of an implied licence”. Instead, 
the Court would recognise that the owner of a car:  
 
…..must be entitled to do whatever is necessary to keep it in running order and to 
effect whatever repairs may be necessary in the most economical way possible. To 
derive this entitlement from an implied licence granted by the original manufacturer 
seems to me quite artificial. It is a right inherent in the ownership of the car itself. To 
curtail or restrict the owner’s right to repair in any way may diminish the value of the 
car. In the field of patent law it may be right to start from the patentee’s express 
monopoly and see how far it is limited by exceptions. In the field of law applied to 
machinery which enjoys no patent protection, it seems to me appropriate to start from 
a consideration of the rights of the owner of the machinery and then to see how far 
the law will permit some conflicting legal claim to impinge upon those rights.
53
 
 
Lord Bridge then provided a very intriguing statement on the power of the courts to deal with 
attempts by IPR holders attempts to control downstream transactions: 
 
It seems to me within the capacity of the common law to adapt to changing social and 
economic conditions to counter the belated emergence of the car manufacturer’s 
attempt to monopolise the spare parts market in reliance on copyright in technical 
drawings by invoking the necessity to safeguard the position of the car owner.
54
 
 
Here, the importance of socio-economic change comes to the fore. The extent to which the 
socio-economic changes wrought both so far and potentially, by integrated goods, necessitate 
a new vision of the role of IP and its connection with sales law, is something that needs 
assessment by commentators and application by the courts. It is this particular aspect which 
provides the only substantive possibility for further application of the general principle 
identified by Lord Bridge (which is broader than merely being a “spare-parts” rule), in light 
of the effective statutory curtailment of the specific application of British Leyland.
55
 
 
Licences of IPRs 
 
Related to the dual concepts of exhaustion and first sale is that of licensing. In the leading 
case of Betts v Wilmott,
56
 the Court of Appeal in Chancery held that where a (British) patent 
holder marketed patented products abroad such action implied a license to use the products in 
the home market. The extent of such a licence is restricted: where the owner of a patent in 
Belgium and England assigned the Belgian patent, such assignment did not imply any 
permission to sell the protected product in England.
57
 These distinctions rest on the 
fundamental distinction between a sale and a licence. 
 
Thus, where goods are sold, the purchaser acquires all rights over the thing purchased unless 
they were reserved. However, with a patent licence, the licensee only acquired those rights 
expressly or necessarily granted. This distinguishes the implied licence doctrine from the 
exhaustion doctrine.
58
 Thus, in HTC Corp v Nokia Corp,
59
 where HTC had acquired goods 
  
from a company (Qualcomm), who had manufactured the chips under licence from Nokia, all 
that HTC acquired was the rights that Qualcomm had. However, the impact of the implied 
licence doctrine has been severely curtailed, not least by EU rules on free movement of 
goods, 
60
 and absent a valid and sufficiently extensive licence the downstream use of patented 
goods is limited to the extent of an exhaustion doctrine,
61
 which as noted, has not so far been 
adopted into English law. 
 
It may be possible to argue that the IPR holder should be compelled to license the IP. 
Although this approach appears to be subject to a strong trend of restriction on the power to 
so compel,
62
 it is still the case that certain IP regimes allow for the possibility of a 
compulsory licence. Thus, under the s.48 of the Patents Act 1977, the Comptroller may grant 
a compulsory licence after three years of the patent period has elapsed. Although a prima 
facie broad, discretionary power, it must be acknowledged that the impact of European 
jurisprudence and the provisions of TRIPs has resulted in the development of relatively 
stringent requirements on granting such a licence.
63
 
 
Refusal to license is a concept often utilised in competition law.
64
 In essence, it involves a 
dominant market player refusing to allow another organisation utilise something which the 
dominant party controls.
65
 It is possible to have different types of refusal to licence, such as 
constructive refusals (where a licence is theoretically available, but the product is substandard 
or the cost of the licences is disproportionate, or “if there is a denial of access to information 
that could potentially effect full technical interoperability between technological products or 
systems’systems”), or conditional refusals (such as where access to product A is conditional 
on accepting product B).
66
  
 
IPRs can be the subject of refusals to licence;
67
 indeed, the leading European case on this 
matter concerned just that. In Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications 
Limited v Commission (Magill TV Guide intervening),
68
 RTE, the Irish broadcasting 
corporation, refused to license television schedules (which were covered by copyright) to 
Magill. The European Court of Justice held that this refusal was abusive conduct, on the 
grounds that: 
 
The exercise of an exclusive intellectual property right may, in exceptional 
circumstances, involve abusive conduct within the meaning of [Article 102 TEU, ex 
Article 82]. This is the case where (a) the owner is the only source of the 
indispensable raw material for a new product … and refuses to provide that raw 
material by relying on national copyright law, thus preventing the appearance of the 
new product, for which there is a potential consumer demand and no actual or 
potential substitute, (b) there is no justification for that refusal … and (c) by its 
conduct, it reserves to itself the secondary product market … by excluding all 
competition on that market.
69
 
 
The presence of these elements is sufficient to give rise to a potential abuse of power, and it 
appears likely that the elements are to be considered cumulatively.
 70
 Whilst there may be 
considerable arguments raised against the application of a refusal to license doctrine, it is not 
the point of this article to engage with that debate, not least because the doctrine is extant.
71
 
Instead the purpose here is to identify the connection between refusals to license and the 
control of IP tyranny. The rules on competition, regardless really of jurisdiction, are focused 
on just that point: market competition. 
  
This article, though, is not concerned with competition, which focuses on the market rather 
than the individual commercial actors that make up the market.
72
 Instead, the aim is to 
demonstrate how complexities in doctrine (broadly conceived) create potential problems for 
individual commercial actors in terms of accurately determining the ownership structures of 
integrated goods. Taking this broader perspective is essential though; if the analysis of refusal 
to license was restricted to the field of competition law then we would have difficulty dealing 
with those situations where the specific behaviour concerned did not, for whatever reason, 
meet the relevant standard (such as that set out in Magill). 
 
As Eagles and Longdin note, IPR holders “who step outside the boundaries of their right 
should not, from that fact alone, be presumed to be acting anti-competitively. Conversely, 
staying religiously within those confines cannot be assumed to confer immunity from 
regulatory intervention.”73 There is thus the possibility of market control below the level of 
unfair or abusive conduct. This sort of behaviour is the purview of the IP tyrant, who is 
described further below. What we can draw from the field of competition law is this: “Digital 
monopolies can be created by prolonged use, by law, or by contract and may be defeated 
through principles that are external to [IP law], namely by anti-trust and competition law.”74 
This is a valuable approach, but the limitations inherent in EU competition law solutions 
necessitate consideration of alternative mechanisms for resolving the potential tyranny of IPR 
holders. 
 
The Current Reform Agenda 
 
The future of consumer protection has been the subject of proposed legislation in the UK. In 
2013, the Government set forth a Consumer Rights Bill,
75
 which, according Jo Swinson MP, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Employment Relations and Consumer Affairs at 
the time, would “bring in a number of changes to improve consumer confidence and make 
sure the law is fit for the 21st century”.76 According to the Department of Business, 
Innovation & Skills, one of the core rights encapsulated in the Bill will be that “goods and 
digital content are fit for purpose and services are provided with reasonable care and skill”.77  
 
This was a necessary development, because, amongst other things, “[c]onsumer rights are 
unclear in the rapidly expanding market of digital products such as phone apps or e-books”.78 
Although focused on consumer rights (and thus the Bill does not provide proposals to govern 
business to business transactions), it arguably still evidences a peculiar absence of integrated 
thinking about the real nature of goods and software, of the nascent but exponentially 
increasing interconnection between sales of goods and IPRs. In particular, the Government 
Response to the Consultation on Consumer Rights states that: 
 
The reforms will modernise the legal framework to ensure that consumer law keeps 
pace with technological developments. 
 
The suite of reforms will modernise the consumer law framework by introducing a new 
regime relating to digital content (such as ebooks and software), and aligning this as far as 
appropriate with the law covering goods and services. 
 
The reforms will introduce clear quality rights for digital content and appropriate remedies 
when these rights are breached. They will also clarify that the short-term right to reject a 
faulty product applies only to digital content on a tangible media (e.g. on a disk), and not 
digital content provided in other ways (e.g. over the internet, such as a music download). This 
  
should provide clarity in an area where it is currently confusing which laws apply. The draft 
Bill will also make clear that a trader must take care that digital content does not harm other 
digital content on a consumer’s device.79 
 
These statements reveal that the Government’s perspective remains wedded to the idea of a 
distinction between digital content, and the things that the digital content is relayed on or to. 
There is no acknowledgement of the notion of embedded software: instead we get a 
distinction between software transmitted digitally or via a physical medium. More exotic but 
technologically feasible developments, such as 3-D printing or nano-technologies, do not 
appear to have been considered. To some degree, this may have been expected: there were no 
questions on such issues during the consultations held during the development of the Bill. 
The acceptance of a definition of goods as ‘“tangible movable items’items”,80 neither deals 
with nor excludes the potential issues concerning either embedded software or 3-D printing. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, whilst the consultation questions did not directly 
address the issue of IPRs and goods (i.e. the problem of third party holders of IPRs having a 
controlling relationship with buyers and sellers of goods), this issue was expressly covered in 
the Government’s response to the consultation. There, it was stated that there would be 
measures introducing ‘“new quality rights for digital content’content”, which would include 
the following: 
 
That the trader has the right to provide the digital content. This right will not affect 
intellectual property rights and will not give consumer a right to use the digital 
content if the trader has no right to provide it; rather it will ensure that the consumer 
has a right to a remedy if provided with digital content that they then have no right to 
use.
81
 
 
This is, of course, no different from the current position under s.12 of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979, because the definitions of goods (“tangible moveable items”) and digital content (“data 
which are produced and supplied in digital form”) given in the proposed clauses 2(7) and (8) 
of the Consumer Rights Bill 2013 do not appear to allow for the possibility of integration. 
Instead, it appears that any embedded software in goods would be treated as a distinct legal 
concept from the goods themselves. The closest the Bill gets to dealing with integration of 
goods and software is clause 15, which provides:  
 
(1) Goods (whether or not they conform otherwise to a contract for the supply of 
goods) do not conform to [to a contract] if 
(a) the goods are an item that includes digital content, and 
(b) the digital content does not conform to the contract to provide that content 
(for which see s.44(2)). 
 
Since clause 44(2) merely provides what rights consumers have in the event of such non-
conformity, clause 15 is all we have to go on with regard to integrated goods. Helpfully 
though, the Explanatory Notes to the Bill provide further evidence.
82
 In explaining clause 15, 
the Notes state that the clause “applies irrespective of the nature of the relationship between 
the digital content and the rest of the goods. For example, for a washing machine to function 
properly it would be necessary for the programme (i.e. the digital content) to be functional 
and this clause would apply if that were not the case.”83 However, this is the extent of the 
analysis of the matter available in the various documents relating to these provisions.
84
 
 
  
The problem with this limited analysis is that there will invariably come a time where 
considerable further work is necessary to set out the jurisprudence on integrated goods with 
greater comprehensiveness than has so far been the case.
85
 So, although the Bill will institute 
protection for purchasers of digital content, through provisions which will mirror those 
available for purchasers of goods,
86
 there is a reliance on the contract provisions themselves 
providing the structure of the analysis, as evidenced by clause 15(1)(b). In other words, how 
the digital content related to the goods will depend on the wording of the contract. 
 
IPR Pirates, Trolls and Tyrants 
 
A third issue that requires considerable analysis is the manner in which doctrine will be able 
to deal with the more nefarious characters of the IP world. Three particular types of “bad 
men” can be identified: the pirate, the troll, and the tyrant. The IP pirate is perhaps the most 
well-known “bad man” of IP law. The pirate acquires IP by some means other than by 
authorised appropriation.
87
 Thus, someone who copies a computer program, or builds goods 
which infringe a patent, or misrepresent the brand of a product, is a pirate.
88
 The IP pirate 
may engage in such activity in order to obtain property, whether in the form of money or 
further IP. However, it is important not to be overly concerned with the purpose of the piracy; 
it is the act of piracy which is important because it is the unauthorised acquisition or retention 
of IP from an IPR holder which differentiates the pirate from trolls and tyrants. Of course, the 
problem with digital information is that the mechanism of transmitting such information 
necessarily involves a copying, and as such there is considerable potential for piracy, whether 
intentional or otherwise. The ease with which this can occur has profound effects on the 
levels of IP piracy.
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The IP troll is a character who, though not a recent development,
90
 has become more well-
known in recent times.
91
 The troll obtains an IPR and then threatens to block usage of such 
IPR.
92
 This may be in order to extort income from those whose activities cross the IPR,
93
 or it 
may be merely to prevent use of the IPR. The key here is recognising that it is the purpose of 
the act of trolling which is most important, i.e. the purpose of obtaining a rental income (or 
excluding others based on a putative rental income) from the IPR: trolls “do not provide end 
products or services themselves, but [they] do demand royalties as a price for authorising the 
work of others”.94 However, it also worth noting that the manner of acquisition may enable a 
valuable differentiation between types of troll. A troll may acquire an IPR by purchase; they 
may intend purely to acquire the potential of an IPR, in order to cover similar expressions of 
the idea(s) behind the IPR.
95
 Alternatively, a troll may have obtained the IPR in order to 
protect their own invention.  In such a case, what make the IPR holder a troll is the attempt to 
expand the reach of the IPR, either by claiming the offending article infringes the IPR due to 
the poor design of the offending article (i.e. the other party went too far), or by claiming an 
IPR which is intrinsically so wide as to prevent the development of other things (e.g. 
claiming an IPR over an optical scanning device, and then claiming that every use of a digital 
camera infringes the IPR). 
 
The IP tyrant owns or controls IPRs (and thus can be distinguished from the pirate), and 
utilises its IPRs in a normal manner, but (and this is the aspect distinguishing the tyrant from 
the troll) they act aggressively against mis-usage of such IPRs but for reputational reasons. 
The troll “has little to worry about in terms of the reputational consequences of going after 
defendants indiscriminately and of suing parties who to traditional copyright owners 
constitute their customers.”96 However, tyrants fear the negation of normal utilisation of their 
IPRs; the normal utilisation involving the creation of market reputation in addition to 
  
exploiting the exchange value of the IPRs. Here, the use of “tyrant” is grounded in the 
unconventional, as opposed to illegitimate, acquisition of power. IPR tyrants acquire power 
through the development of market attachments to brands.
97
 This contrasts with the IPR 
pirate who engages in avoiding the exercise of power (by the IPRs holder) and the IPR troll 
who acquires power legitimately and conventionally. 
 
A good example of an IP tyrant would be a pharmaceutical company actively preventing the 
development and disposition of generic versions of its patented products in less-developed 
countries. Another example would be a technology company refusing to allow software 
developers access to its copyrighted software in order to develop products for such software. 
A third example would a manufacturer refusing to allow certain types of distribution of its 
goods (e.g. grey market Levi jeans sold in supermarkets). A fourth example might be the 
utilisation by IPRs holders of legal powers to prevent the development of technologies, even 
including those that meet the spirit and the letter of the law.
98
 One such instance of this may 
be the putative attempt by Microsoft to control sub-ownership of computer games software. It 
was suggested that sub-users of computer games operating on the new Xbox One games 
console would be required to pay a fee,
99
 or such games would only be tradable through 
certain approved markets,
100
 thus having the impact of attempting to control disposition of 
ownership of the games far down the chain of transactions. Another example might be the 
abuse of standard-essential patents, such as Motorola Mobility’s obtaining an injunction 
against Apple for infringement of patents concerning data transmission, following the 
breakdown of negotiations over an appropriate licence fee. In that instance, the European 
Commission issued a Statement of Objection against this action, on the grounds that such 
action by Motorola Mobility would harm competition and reduce consumer choice.
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Though it is possible to distinguish between a troll and a tyrant,
102
 ultimately, what both 
characters create is gridlock; it is an example of the tragedy of the anticommons.
103
 This 
situation arises when there are too many right holders, and by exercising their rights over a 
resource they prevent others from using or creating that resource.  This peculiar aspect of 
private property is problematic enough, but its negative consequences are exacerbated by the 
effect of IP trolling and tyranny. 
 
As Balganesh notes: “[b]eing a complete outsider to the market for creative works – in that it 
is not a producer, distributor, consumer, or indeed user of such works – the troll operates on a 
fundamentally different calculus of when to enforce the copyright claim from that of the 
original copyright owners.”104 The “different calculus” of the troll means they take advantage 
of the general under-enforcement of private law claims, which can eradicate the equilibrium 
between actionable and enforced claims and actionable but unenforced claims.
105
 This is due 
to the delegation by IP law, as a system of private law, the choice between enforcing 
actionable claims to IPRs holders.
106
 
 
Furthermore, “brands are subject to ongoing interaction and definition. The company and its 
product may initiate the relationship, but power diffuses after that moment”.107 There is a 
multi-directional relationship between brand-holder and consumer (here, the consumer may 
well be a business as well as a private consumer). The brand-holder may not actually be the 
producer, but by putting their brand onto goods the goods are transformed, not in the sense 
that they change function, but in the sense that the IPR holder has a greater power to connect 
with the consumer (and vice versa),
108
 which is expressed by “generating and controlling 
consumer identity”.109 This is particularly problematic when the potential reach of IPRs is 
recognised.  
  
Thus, in the 2011 Report of the International Intellectual Property Alliance,
110
 copyright 
industries are defined with such liberty as to make a mockery of the whole enterprise. These 
“copyright industries” include fabric, jewelryjewellery, furniture, toys and games, 
transportation services, telecommunications, wholesale and retail trade, and makers and 
distributers of CD players, TV sets, VCRs, computers, blank recording material, and paper. It 
defies any notion of common sense to include these categories in the “copyright industry.”111 
 
Whilst Carrier may have been right in questioning the extent to which this broad definition of 
“copyright industries” can really be applied to manufacturers of paper and fabric, the extent 
to which he is right depends entirely on the nature of the debate. For Carrier, the debate 
concerned music, and in that sense he rightly identifies the absurdity of the attempts to latch 
music on to other industries in an attempt to over-inflate the costs of music piracy. However, 
those industries mentioned by the International Intellectual Property Alliance would be 
concerned not just with copyright but with a whole range of IPRs. 
 
It is perhaps necessary to take the International Intellectual Property Alliance’s analysis with 
a pinch of salt, as it is, essentially, a lobbying organisation for IPR holders.
112
 Nevertheless, it 
reveals first, that IPRs have an enormous range; all sort of physical things can have some sort 
of IPR attached to it, and secondly, that IPRs holders can engage in a sort of intellectual 
imperialism, i.e. IP tyranny. Yes, the jewellery industry (for example) is a “copyright” 
industry, in that it may well involve copyright issues (notwithstanding any other IPRs). But 
surely the more rational perspective would be to consider the jewellery industry as a “sale of 
goods” industry: its purpose is not to hold IPRs, but to sell goods: the jewellery. The purpose 
of the IPRs in such a case will be to prevent copies of their goods from being passed off as 
the original. In this case, IPRs operate as a protection for sellers which are the converse of the 
rules against mis-descriptions which exists for the benefit of purchasers.
113
 
 
Future Developments 
 
As Cornish, Llewellyn and Aplin make clear: “[IPRs] are constantly destabilised by 
technological advance”.114  Society is shifting into a new industrial revolution, which “will 
see manufacturing going ‘digital’ and ‘personal’. It is also expected to be disruptive: the 
question is whether this disruptive technology will prove to be more advantageous than 
disadvantageous.”115 
 
3-D Printers 
 
In May 2013, media reports arose suggesting that the first 3-D printed handgun had been 
successfully fired.
116
 This naturally generated some considerable debate both about the 
validity of the product and the ethics surrounding the potential for home manufacture of 
guns.
117
 There are potential further issues arising from 3-D printing, such as its utility for 
space travel,
118
 and the potential of moving from plastic printing (the mainstay of current 
technology) to printing metallic or organic things.
119
 In its description of an exhibition 
running from October 2013 until June 2014 entitled “3D: printing the future”, the Science 
Museum, London stated that visitors can “discover how innovators are using 3D printers to 
turn computer data into physical objects that could change your life”.120 
 
It is this process – turning data into things – that raises interesting questions about the role of 
ownership, of goods and of IPRs, in the development and production of 3-D printed objects. 
Two issues come out of this: (1) the extent to which current commercial entities may suffer 
  
due to a failure to appreciate the potentially revolutionary nature of effective 3-D printing;
121
 
and (2) the extent to which individuals can recapture the manufacturing process away from 
larger organisations.
122
 As Engstrom writes: “3-D printers … have arrived. Home 3-D 
printers are already affordable (some are less than $1000), and, though these printers make 
mostly straightforward products, that’s apt to change.”123  Yet, as Engstrom also notes, legal 
scholars (amongst others) need to “consider how the innovation meshes with – or poses 
challenges to – our existing laws and system of governance”.124 She goes on to briefly outline 
the potential problems arising from the application of product liability law to defective home-
printed objects. 
 
One potential problem that Engstrom highlights is the lack of coverage of US product 
liability law for situations involving a victim of a bad design for a 3-D printed object. The 
designer of the code or plan which is used by the printer would not be liable as under US law, 
only those who seller “tangible personal property” are covered.125 Although the case law 
seems to fall down against the victim, in that the code would not be a qualifying “product”, 
Engstrom suggests that there is the potential for doctrinal development though we must 
“recognise that this tangible-intangible distinction might end up being a significant 
barrier”.126 The biggest problem though is that “3-D printing democratises product creation 
… [and] severs the long-established identity between manufacturers and sellers, on the one 
hand, and enterprises, on the other”.127 
 
Mendis has recently provided a powerful analysis of the impact of 3-D printing on IP law.
128
 
She argued that the IP implications of 3-D printing needs “serious consideration”; that the 
borderline between infringements and non-infringements is malleable and needs close 
attention in light of the potential for sharing digital designs.
129
 Although Mendis identified a 
number of avenues for IP law to control 3-D printing, in doctrinal areas concerning the 
distinction between making and repairing in patent cases,
130
 she also noted that putative 
attempts by IPR holders to protect their interests via digital rights management (DRM) would 
fail in the same way that DRM failed for the entertainment industry.
131
 
 
Mendis further suggests that the nature of 3-D printing of spare parts would not infringe a 
registered design,
132
 although potential problems arise in the context of unregistered design 
rights, specifically in the context of secondary infringement on the part of hosts of the digital 
design rights.
133
 Although Lucasfilm v Ainsworth,
134
 suggests that a measure of protection 
may be available for the creators of objects using 3-D printing, problems will arise due to the 
nature of mass sharing of digital information.
135
 She concludes that the IP implications are 
“unclear”, not least because some actions may avoid liability under one area of IP law but not 
under another area.
136
 As such, she recommends that changes in business methods would be 
the most effective way of dealing with this area of technological developments.
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Three dimensional printing gives rise to some intriguing problems in terms of piracy. The 
nature of three dimensional printing requires information, in crude terms the blueprints, of the 
object of production. This information will inevitably be in digital form, and thus, for the 
purposes of English law at least, would be protected by copyright. Additional IPRs are 
potentially possible. Unauthorised acquisition of the digital information by a pirate would 
enable them to produce tangible goods. If such goods are resold, there is arguably an 
infringement of s.12 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the problems of which have been 
discussed above. However, it is the problem of democratised production which may give rise 
to more complex problems, particularly if IP tyrants become involved. 
 
  
Embedded and Nano-Technologies 
 
Embedded technologies are those which are integrated into other technologies, whereby 
without the embedded technology the broader technology becomes either useless or limited in 
its usability. One particular example is embedded software.
138
 There are a considerable 
variety of goods that have embedded software. This connection between goods and software 
is particularly evident in certain obvious cases, such as smartphones. Embedded software is 
also present in a number of other types of goods, from a car through to a fridge. The 
embedded software may be necessary for sound functioning of the material thing to which it 
is attached, although its benevolence or malevolence may be identifiable only with an 
advanced level of technological know-how. Nevertheless, in either case, the embedded 
software may lead to problems with the goods themselves. This is problematic in light of the 
likely massive increase in usage of integrated goods. 
 
A recent intriguing phenomena is the growth in wearable technology. First, it must be 
recognised that the general concept of wearable technology is neither modern nor novel; 
clothes are possibly the simplest wearable technology. The passive nature of such technology 
can be contrast with active wearable technologies, such as a watch. Of course, technological 
development means that integration is more likely. Wearable technologies may be enhanced 
by nanotechnologies. At a passive and simple level, this may involve the utilisation of 
particular types of fabrics and materials to obtain a specific result: a good example is the 
proliferation of breathable man-made fabrics, i.e. fabrics which enable sweat to evaporate 
whilst repelling rain. Future developments are likely to see the embedding of 
nanotechnologies in wearable technology, particularly with the development of an internet of 
things.
139
 
 
A recent development of this nature is Google Glass,
140
 a technology involving a specially 
designed single lens, to be worn as if like a pair of glasses. This lens is connected to the 
internet and is able to display information in a head-up style display to the wearer, either 
automatically or upon command.
141
 The possibility of wide-spread use of such a product 
gives rise to multiple potential legal questions,
142
 but for the purposes of this article, it is 
worth noting that currently Google appears to be imposing considerable restrictions on the 
rights and capacity of those acquiring Google Glass to dispose of such goods.
143
 
 
A logical step (even if it gives rise to hard ethical questions) is the combination of embedded 
technologies that are worn, and personal embedding of software and hardware in the human 
body. This may take the form of methods of communication,
144
 or it may involve the creation 
of “super-ability” (in correspondence to disability and ability) whereby a person’s abilities 
are amplified by the addition of technologies.
145
 One current state-of-the art nanotechnology 
is nano-tattoos, an “intradermally embedded array of biosensors, functionalised to emit 
visible colour changes”; they are often used to monitor glucose levels in people with 
diabetes.
146
 
 
Bennett and Naranja suggest that patents covering nano-tattoos need to be “narrowly 
tailored”, and there is a danger of “patent thickets” developing as “it is not unusual for a 
single nano-enabled invention to be covered by multiply overlapping patents”.147 Another 
form of nano-tattoo would be devices that help connections with other devices. For instance, 
Motorola has filed a patent for a device that would couple a tattoo to a mobile communication 
device.
148
 The development of nano-technologies could be restricted by IPR claims (even if 
such claims are merely an apparent threat).  Furthermore, it can be recognised that objections 
  
may be raise to the manner in which IPR management of technology which is embedded in 
humans, whether at a nano-technological level or otherwise, may lead to (a) unwelcome 
commodification,
149
 and (b) “arrogant and naïve” belief that “commercial interests” can solve 
the problems of these bionic developments.
150
 
 
Solutions to Potential Problems 
 
The drawing out of consumer law from the general law of sale in the UK, via the Consumer 
Rights Bill, provided the opportunity to set out new and distinct protection for consumers of 
digital content. However, and regardless of the fact that this approach does not provide for 
embedded software as it rests on a distinction between digital and tangible, a corresponding 
legal development has not been provided in what would be a (Commercial) Sale of Goods 
Act. It thus remains for contracting commercial parties to determine the governing regulations 
for their transaction. They may be able to construct sui generis rules for transactions 
involving embedded software, and transactions involving digital content per se. 
 
There is, of course, a very strong argument in favour of this maintenance of a principle of 
party autonomy. Problems relating to, say, copyright infringement may be soluble through 
technological changes, and in such an event, legal machinery will be required primarily to 
underpin the e-contracts of the management system. Copyright will not even be needed to 
define the material in which there is a property right to be licensed. The contract can relate to 
material that is outside any copyright “[i]t can require payment even where copyright law 
creates an exception … [and] [t]hat obligation will be enforceable unless the law debars 
it”.151 
 
Because the state is generally only willing to use its nuclear weapon, criminal sanctions, 
following action by an IP industry body, IPR holders “are obliged to balance the profits on 
their own investments against the costs of privately enforcing their rights”.152 Yet, if we bear 
in mind Balganesh’s analysis of copyright trolls, we must recognise that the deviant 
behaviour of trolls and tyrants is possible due to the way that private law allows the owners 
of rights to determine whether to enforce those rights. We can distinguish between a structure 
which allows for enforcement choices and a structure which not only allows for enforcement 
choices but also allows for the determination of what constitutes an actionable infringement. 
The lack of provisions on sales of goods with embedded software, and the potential 
difficulties in characterising three dimensional printing and nanotechnologies, necessitates 
the creation of structures of governance by private parties. This exacerbates the potential for 
trolls and tyrants to control the usage of IPRs, and thus consequently, control the usage of 
goods. This, in turn, has serious negative implications for parties attempting to plan their 
relations and transactions,
153
 as well as potentially causing “democratic degradation”.154 
 
Yet is it the case, as Cornish suggests, that “it would probably be an even uglier world if the 
taxpayer became the guardian of this form of property, to the same extent that the police and 
local authorities are the protectors of land, houses and goods”?155 Certainly, the urgency of 
developing legal mechanisms which would prevent or limit IPR holders from controlling the 
exploitation and alienation of their IP must have only increased, in light of technological 
developments, in the decade since Cornish argued that “there must be a case for giving judges 
some more general power to excuse at the edges”.156 It may be that the problem lies in the 
fact that there is a choice between governance of IPRs based on “a simple ‘property rights’ 
approach: whenever a reasonably efficient system of payment can be established for specific 
uses, it should be given legal support in pursuit of optimal efficiency”,157 and a system which 
  
limits the power of IPR holders from reaching down chains of transactions and exploiting the 
freedom provided by legal systems, unwilling or unable to control such actions through 
criminal sanction, for private ordering of rights and obligations. 
 
Mendis argued that a potential route around the problems of IP law for 3-D printing would be 
changes in business methods. Whilst Mendis’ suggestion has practical value, it may be 
subject to critique. For one, it is difficult to ascertain whether these changes in business 
methods would actually occur. Since the protection for IPR holders is considerable, and they 
can control the usage of their IP downstream by means of contract – the approach that is at 
the heart of the proposed consumer law reforms in the UK – it may be that IPR holders would 
not voluntarily alter their business methods in order to adopt a position which provides them 
with potentially less control over the usage of their IPR. 
 
Another potential problem with relying on novel business methods is that it fails to address 
the underlying doctrinal causes of the problems, i.e. the failure of sales and IP law to provide 
a coherent doctrinal structure for the management of ownership issues of integrated goods. 
This is problematic if we recognise that “even if a technology is used for infringement in the 
short-term, that can raise awareness of its potential for non-infringing uses in the long run”.158 
Yet, if the infringement can be strictly curtailed, which would be the case under current IP 
and sales doctrine and could occur regardless of calls to change business methods, then we 
may never know what would have been developed had early innovators not been threatened 
by IPR holders.
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As noted above, compulsory licences may be imposed in order to prevent the otherwise 
monopolistic powers of patent holders from distorting use of a product. Ng has further argued 
that compulsory licences may provide a mechanism which would enable legal systems to get 
around the potential problems arising from a proliferation of patents growing out of the IT 
and biotechnology sectors, and specifically the potential of patent trolling in such sectors.
160
  
 
Compulsory licences would be appropriate if they are limited “to cases involving cumulative 
complex inventions where the conduct of the patent owner’s enforcement of the exclusionary 
patent rights results in serious impairment or significant disruption to society”. They would 
also be acceptable as trolling “cannot constitute “normal exploitation” of patent rights”. 
Thirdly, “patent owners cannot claim a ‘legitimate interest’ in the economic benefits that 
could be derived from ‘trolling’ activities”.161 Additionally, “any patent trolling activity that 
causes severe disruption to legitimate businesses and the normal and smooth functioning of 
society should be deemed to be inimical to public interest”.162 However, the concept of 
compulsory licences is very much an unorthodox solution, and is susceptible to lobbying 
efforts.
163
 As such, it is questionable whether a sufficiently secure system of protection for 
downstream purchases of integrated goods based on compulsory licenses could be efficiently 
and consistently applied. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In a world of increasing interconnection and embedding of IPRs and goods, it remains 
necessary to consider the relationships between IP and goods, and between integrations of 
goods and IP and their human users.
164
 As to the first point, the relationship between IP and 
goods, questions must be raised about the feasibility and value of the current doctrinal 
structure of both IP law and sale of goods law. As can be seen with the Consumer Rights Bill, 
it is not necessarily the case the modern legislative developments can fully reflect 
  
technological change: the focus in that Bill on digital content appears to maintain (and 
potentially preserve) the unwelcome and unreal distinction between digital information and 
tangible things.
165
 Goods with embedded software are not catered for. Furthermore, the 
failure (so far at least) to recognise that the necessary result of the Consumer Rights Bill will 
be a (Commercial) Sale of Goods Act, and the more pernicious consequence that there 
remains no coverage in that Act for integrated goods, renders the doctrine confused. 
 
As to the point about the relationship between humans and the integrated goods they use, it is 
arguable that the attempts to control the rights of purchasers are evidence of an amoral 
(possibly immoral) grasping for exploitation rights on the part of IPR holders. As Cornish 
wrote: “[p]ersonal choice and privacy are individual values of a high order, both 
psychological and political. They are frequently dependent upon the possession of things, 
including, now, things configured by electrical impulses. The interconnection is a root reason 
why the property rights of individuals have some claim to be ranked as human rights.”166 It is 
also potentially arguable that control over ownership rights downstream from the IPR holders 
could negatively affect an individual’s development, achievement and maintenance of 
personhood,
167
 or that there could be implications for such an individual’s happiness.168 
 
Cornish, Llewellyn and Aplin warn us that, whilst IP law “protects some of the finer 
manifestations of human achievement, it also shields much that is trivial and ephemeral. The 
ultimate are in the shaping of IP policy lies in securing outcomes that are proportionate to the 
aim of that protection”.169 However, the shaping of IP policy alone cannot provide a 
sufficient basis for the development of appropriate legal provisions for the sale of integrated 
goods. The disintegration of the distinction between tangible and intangible elements of 
goods necessitates further analysis and critique of the value of distinguishing between the IP 
and non-IP elements of tangible goods. This is not a claim for the abolition of IP law. But 
neither is it a case of “keep calm and carry on”. 
 
That phrase, notable in the UK for spawning imitations and parodies of what was once an 
unused World War II propaganda poster, was also the title of Professor Sir Robin Jacob’s 
inaugural lecture as the Sir Hugh Laddie Professor in Intellectual Property Law.
170
 Jacob 
argued that “[w]e should keep calm about mistaken alarmists such as the abolitionists and 
over-zealous competition lawyers, but we should be vigilant about curbing the excessive 
growth of copyright and design law. As for trade mark law, we can only despair”.171 
 
Be that as it may, this article has not set out to examine IP law on its own. It has considered 
the connection between IP and sales, with the focus on the issue of determining ownership. 
Whilst it is clear that under English sales law an IPR holder has considerable power (or, put 
another way, the purchaser of goods is subject to the potentially unknown and uncontrollable 
exercise of power by an IPR holder), it is also clear that there are various routes by which 
ownership-control by IPR holders can be limited or eradicated by IP law itself. The problem 
is that these IP approaches are not clearly connected with sales law. Furthermore, there is a 
serious lack of clarity and certainty about the extent of the IPR holder’s power over sub-
purchasers, and this problem will continue and be exacerbated by the developments in 
integrated goods. 
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